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1 Introduction
Commercial fishermen in the eastern Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery target primarily shallow
grouper species, deep water groupers and other reef fish. Current management measures in
the primarily grouper fishery include a license limitation, annual catch quotas for heavily
targeted species, per trip catch limits, minimum size limits, area/gear restrictions, and sea-
son closures.1 Despite extensive restrictions on harvesting activities, the National Marine
Fisheries Service classifies several high-value and large-volume reef fish species as overfished
(red, gag, and yellowedge groupers). Furthermore, recurrent adjustment to regulations and
conflicts between gear types–vertical hook and line, long lines and fish traps–over in-
creasingly diminished resource stocks subsumes time and eﬀorts of regulators charged with
protecting fish stocks. In the wake of these problems, the Gulf of Mexico Fisheries Manage-
ment Council and industry have begun an evaluation of alternatives to the current controlled
access management approach which might improve economic and biological conditions in
the fishery.2
One alternative being considered is individual fishing quotas (IFQs).3 IFQs grant a
right to harvest specified quantities of grouper and other reef fish species during each fish-
ing season. Market-based incentives implicit in IFQs promise to increase the economic
performance of harvesting operations, stabilize the economic and regulatory environment
and improve safety for fishermen. Substantial gains in economic performance, i.e., har-
vesting eﬃciency, are expected to emerge under IFQ management (Gulf of Mexico Fishery
Management Council, 2007). However, the actual eﬃciency gains cannot be fully observed
until adjustments to harvesting practices and fleet composition that take place in response
to the economic incentives implicit in the IFQ program are completed. This paper predicts
changes in fleet structure and per-vessel harvesting activities that are expected under the
1Eight major grouper species are targeted in the eastern region of the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery:
black, gag, scamp, yellowedge, warsaw, and snowy groupers, and speckled hind.
2Groupers are a popular target of recreational fishermen. In 2004 the recreational sector exceeded its
target quota for red grouper by 254%, prompting a call for tightened restrictions on recreational fishing
(see Secretarial Amendment 1 to the Fisheries Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of
Mexico). The recreational fishery is not considered in this paper.
3Amendment 29 to the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf of Mexico
considers the merits of several management alternatives including, the elimination of latent permits, a
buyback or buyout program, permit endorsements, an individual fishing quota program, and an individual
transferable eﬀort quota program.
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proposed IFQ program.4 Based on these predictions, an estimate of the economic benefits
from replacing the current controlled access management program with IFQs is derived.
Current regulatory and economic conditions in the grouper fishery suggest several po-
tential sources for improved harvesting performance (Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management
Council, 2007). First, the fishery is considered to have excess harvesting capacity. Eco-
nomic incentives implicit in IFQ programs align fleet harvesting capacity with target harvest
levels set by managers, which can result in economics of scale and possibly economies of
scope. Knowledge of the extent of fleet downsizing is necessary to determine how significant
these economies will be. Second, eﬃciency gains are expected as tradable harvest permits
gravitate to the most productive vessel operations in the fleet. Lastly, controlled access
regulations such as per-trip catch limits and seasonal closures, currently used to prevent
overfishing, will be eliminated yielding further cost savings.
The conceptual approach for estimating the anticipated cost savings from adopting IFQs
in the grouper fishery follows Weninger and Waters (2003). Currently available data is an-
alyzed to measure the key sources of harvesting ineﬃciency under the current management
program. The results are then used to predict vessel-level harvesting activities and equilib-
rium fleet structure expected to emerge under IFQs.
In this paper a semi-parametric empirical model recently developed by Simar and Wil-
son (2007) is used to analyze ineﬃciency under current management. The semi-parametric
model oﬀers several advantages over single-step data envelopment analysis.5 The first
step employs non-parametric methods (data envelopment analysis) to derive vessel-level
eﬃciency measures. Bootstrap procedures correct for bias inherent in finite sample non-
parametric models (see Simar and Wilson, 2000). Non-parametric models avoid potential
functional form bias, and provide a convenient framework to examine factors such as scale
4Weninger and Waters (2003) study the potential eﬀects of adopting rights-based managment in the
northern region of the reef fish fishery. Dupont (2000), Squires and Kirkley (1995, 1996), and Squires,
Alauddin and Kirkley (1994) provide ex ante estimates of the potential gains from tradable harvest permits.
Studies examining the performance of existing programs are increasingly available, e.g., Grafton, Squires
and Fox (2000).
5Single-step nonparametric frontier models have been used extensively to study economic performance
and capacity utilization in commercial fisheries (e.g., Kirkley et al., 2002; Weninger and Waters, 2003;
Walden, 2006). Färe et al. (1994), and Coelli et al. (1998) provide exhaustive reviews of nonparametric
frontier models.
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ineﬃciency which is thought to be significant under controlled access regulation.6 The
empirical model includes a second-stage parametric analysis which links the measured per-
formance of individual vessel operations to environmental factors.
The added information from the second stage may be particularly useful for managers
and industry concerned with the broader impacts of fisheries management reform. For exam-
ple, our stage two results link harvesting performance under controlled access management
to observable vessel characteristics, skipper experience, gear types (longline, vertical line
and fish traps) and the port from which vessels fish. The relationship between our environ-
mental factors and vessel performance provide key insights into fleet adjustment expected
in the switch to IFQ management. Results find that the IFQ-regime fleet will likely be
dominated by mid-sized vessels operated by mid-career captains, whereas fleet restructur-
ing is not predicted to vary significantly across gear types or geographical regions of the
fishery. This information can guide policy makers concerned with the transition to the new
equilibrium conditions in the fishery. In particular, vessel operations deemed most likely
to be impacted by management reform can be the focus of policies designed to ease the
transition caused by management reform.
The data analyzed in this paper is from a stratified sample of 149 vessel owner operators
who landed reef fish (primarily groupers) during the 1993 season in the eastern Gulf of
Mexico. While somewhat dated, this data provide a view of vessel harvesting activities in
the absence of many of the recently tightened controlled-access regulations. Since controlled
access regulations will be removed under IFQs, the harvesting practices, i.e., input and
output choices for our 1993 sample, can provide a reasonable representation of vessel activity
expected under IFQ management. The downside is that 1993 data is conditioned on stock
abundance and other economic conditions that prevailed in the fishery at the time. The
implications of the results for the current day management is interpreted with this caveat
in mind.
The analysis identifies two factors as the key sources of economic gains under an IFQ
management program. First, economies of scale in production are expected as the aggregate
commercial harvest is consolidated onto fewer boats. Second, economies in the form of pure
6See Kumbhakar and Knox Lovell (2000) for a review of parametric methods for eﬃciency analysis.
4
technical eﬃciency gains are expected as the bulk of the harvesting activities are carried out
by the most eﬃcient vessel operations in the fleet. Results indicates that the IFQ-regime
fleet will consist of roughly 200-250 vessels. In comparison, 990 vessels reported positive
landings in the eastern Gulf reef fish fishery in 1993. While many of these vessels are part
time commercial operations who landing small quantities of reef fish, the extent of fleet
downsizing that is expected under IFQs is significant.
Calculations reveal further that fleet downsizing and redistribution of the catch to pro-
ductive boats will reduce variable harvesting costs by as much as 30% in the fishery; a $7.07
million cost saving is predicted in the year of the data (all values are in 1993 dollars). Ad-
ditional fixed cost savings, which are more diﬃcult to quantify due to the part time nature
many active vessels, are also expected.7 While direct extrapolation of the 1993 cost savings
estimates is not possible, the results indicate that significant cost savings are available in
the grouper fishery under an IFQ management program. Given the current regulatory en-
vironment which proposes tighter per-trip catch limits and quotas on more grouper species,
it is likely that our results understate the benefits of management reform in the current
day fishery. Overall, the results suggest that IFQs represent an attractive alternative to the
current controlled access management program for the grouper fishery.
The next section introduces a conceptual model of harvest eﬃciency and fleet structure
in an IFQ-managed fishery. Section 3 describes the data and empirical methodology. Results
are presented in Section 4. Section 5 predicts vessel harvesting activities, fleet structure
and harvest costs expected under IFQ management. A summary and concluding remarks
follows in Section 6.
7Retiring redundant underutilized vessel capital saves resources required to maintain capital in working
order. Commercial fishing vessels often participate in multiple fisheries using multiple gear types each year.
Lacking data on total participation, it is conceptually and empirically diﬃcult to allocate maintenance costs
across fisheries.
5
2 Model of harvesting eﬃciency
Consider a representative fisherman who allocates inputs x ∈ <N+ to produce outputs y ∈
<M+ during a single fishing season. Feasible input-output combinations are given as;
(1) T = {(x, y)| x can produce y}.
T is assumed to be a closed, and convex set. The output directional distance function
(ODDF) provides a convenient functional representation of feasible input/output combina-
tions;
(2)
−→
D(x, y; gy) = max{β ∈ <|(x, y + βgy) ∈ T},
where gy ∈ <M+ (gy 6= 0M) is a directional vector. The ODDF gives the maximal translation
of the output y in the reference direction gy that keeps the (translated) output in the
set T . The ODDF directly measures output-oriented technical eﬃciency in the sense that
when
−→
D(x, y|gy) = 0, no feasible translation of the output vector y is possible, whereas
−→
D(x, y|gy) > 0 indicates that y is located in the interior of T . Frontier output is calculated
as y +
−→
D(x, y|gy)gy. Chambers, Chung, and Färe (1996) and Färe and Grosskopf (2000)
provide additional discussion of directional distance functions.
The more familiar Shephard (1970) output distance function is a special case of the
ODDF. The Shephard output distance function is
(3) Do(x, y) = inf
θ
{θ : (x, y/θ) ∈ T}.
At directional vector gy = y, it can be shown that
−→
D(x, y|y) = Do(x, y)−1 − 1.
It will be convenient to work with the Farrell measure of output technical eﬃciency,
which is the inverse of the Shephard output distance function. The relationship between
the Farrell measure, which we will denote as δ(x, y), the Shephard output distance function,
and the ODDF is as follows (see Färe and Grosskopf, 2000):
δ(x, y) = Do(x, y)−1 = 1 +
−→
D(x, y|y).
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We turn next to the implications of harvesting eﬃciency for equilibrium fleet structure in
an IFQ fishery.
2.1 Fleet structure under IFQ fishery management
Under IFQ management, tradable harvest permits, which sum to the target total harvest
level for each fish species, are distributed to fishermen. Let Yi denote the total allowable har-
vest for species i = 1, ...,M fish. With frictionless permit trading, a per period lease prices
λi will emerge for each permitted species. We assume that active fishing firms purchase or
sell harvest permits and purchase factor inputs to maximize profits;
π(r, w) = max
(x,y≥0)
{ry − wx} ,
where w denotes a vector of unit input prices, and r is the net price for fish. Letting p
denote the vector of dockside prices, the net fish price is r = (p− λ).
It can be shown that the following inequality holds (Chambers et al., 1998),
π(r, w) ≥ ry − wx+ r−→D(x, y|gy)gy
≥ r
³
1 +
−→
D(x, y|y)
´
y − wx,
where maximum profit is given by
(4) π(r, w) = max
(x,y)≥0
n
ry − wx+ r−→D(x, y|gy)gy
o
.
Expression 4 indicates that profits are maximized only if activity (x, y) is located on the
boundary of the feasible set T , or in other words, if
−→
D(x, y|gy) = 0.
Assuming that all permit lease prices are strictly positive, equilibrium conditions under
the IFQ management program are given as,
PK∗
k=1y
k
i = Yi i = 1, ...,M(C1)
K∗ = argmax
K
{PKk=1r∗yk − wxk}(C2)
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Condition C1 and C2 simultaneously determine equilibrium lease prices and the number
of harvesting firms, denoted K∗ that are active in the fishery under the IFQ program.
Harvesting firms and vessel operations will hereafter be treated synonymously.
Condition C1 states that for each species the total catch of the fleet must equal the
total allowable harvest, which is assumed to be set exogenously by the fishery management
authority. Condition C2 states that the K∗ active vessel operations must attain the largest
overall (net) harvesting profits, conditional on the available harvest Y1, .., YM . Notice that
condition C2 explicitly allows for ineﬃciency to persist under the IFQ program. That is,
r∗yk − wxk = π(r∗, w)− r∗−→D(xk, yk|gy)gy,
so that active firms may operate in the interior of T . The condition for equilibrium however
does suggest that no inactive vessel can design a harvest plan and profitably enter the
fishery. The implication is that active vessels must be the best at exhausting available
production economies, e.g., economies from adjusting the scale and scope of operation and
output technical eﬃciency.
In the context of the ODDF measure of eﬃciency, active vessels must attain the small-
est possible value for
−→
D(xk, yk|gy). If this were not the case then some redistribution of
harvesting permits among active and inactive vessel operations could increase net harvest-
ing profits in the fishery. Gains from permit trading would exist, which contradicts the
equilibrium condition. Lastly, notice that because the profits are evaluated at the net price
r∗ = p−λ∗ condition C2 also ensures that the maximum available resource rent is generated
from the total allowable catch levels set by the manager.8
The empirical goal of the paper is to identify the equilibrium fleet configuration, and the
per vessel activity levels which satisfy conditions C1 and C2. Given an estimate of K∗ and
activity levels (xk, yk) for vessels under the IFQ management regime, estimates of economic
performance, benefits relative to the current regulatory conditions in the fishery, readily
emerge. The next section describes the data and empirical approach used for this purpose.
8A dynamic bioeconomic model could be used to identify the resource rent maximizing values fot Y1, ..., YM
(Clark, 1990).
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3 Background, data, and estimation
The reef fish fishery in the Gulf of Mexico is a complex of bottom-dwelling species consisting
of red, black, yellowedge, gag, warsaw and other species of groupers, amberjacks, triggerfish,
porgies, tilefish, and red, vermilion, and other snapper species. Vertical hook and lines,
longlines and fish traps are the main gear types used in the year of our data, 1993. Managers
and industry have adopted a convention of dividing the Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery into
northern and eastern regions. The northern region extends from Panama City, Florida
west along the Texas shore to Mexico. Red snapper is the predominate (by volume and
value) species targeted in the northern region. The analysis of this paper is focussed on the
eastern region of the reef fish fishery which extends from Panama City, Florida east and
south along the Florida coast to the Florida Keys. Because grouper species are the main
target, the eastern Gulf reef fish fishery is often referred to as the grouper fishery.9
There are 15 species of grouper managed by the Reef Fish Fisheries Management Plan.
The main species by harvested volume and economic value are Red, Gag and Black grouper,
which are part of a shallow water complex, and Yellowedge grouper which is a deepwater
grouper species. A host of other reef fish species are also harvested. In the year of our data,
1993, regulations used to control fishing pressure included vessel licenses, and minimum
size restrictions for most species of shallow water groupers. Long line fishing gear was not
permitted in some areas.
Data were gathered from two sources: a stratified survey of vessel owner/operators that
was conducted for the 1993 harvest season (Waters, 1996 provides a detailed description of
the data and survey design), and National Marine Fisheries Service log book records. The
survey elicited cost and other information through personal interviews from 196 vessel oper-
ators, of which 150 harvested reef fish in the eastern Gulf region. National Marine Fisheries
Service Log Book reporting system records trip-level information on harvest quantities, trip
length, and the number of crew members on board the vessel.
The sample vessels harvested 4.417 million pounds of fish in 1993 with over 90 diﬀerent
species represented. While the number of species is large, a much smaller group make up
9Weninger and Waters (2003) analyze the benefits of adopting a rights-based management program in
the northern Gulf reef fish fishery using standard non-parametric (data envelopment analysis) methods.
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the bulk of the catch. Red grouper represents the largest component accounting for 43.4%
of the total, vermilion snapper accounts for 13.0%, black grouper (7.3%), sharks (4.9%),
grunts (4.8%), gag grouper (4.5%), greater amberjack (2.9%) and yellowedge grouper (2.8%)
are also important.
Tractability requires that individual reef fish species be aggregated to form output
groups. Feedback from grouper fishermen suggests that three output groups are appro-
priate based on similarity in harvesting practices, e.g., fishing locations, depths, bait, and
capture methods, used to harvest the species within each group. Harvested quantities
within each output category are aggregated linearly. The aggregation procedure assumes
that optimal input choices and aggregate output levels can be chosen independently of the
mix of species within each output category. The harvest technology is thus assumed to ex-
hibit weak output separability. Linear aggregation implies a constant rate of transformation
among species within each output group.10
The first output group, y1, is made up primarily of shallow water groupers including
red, gag, black, yellowfin and yellowedge grouper. Scamp, red and rock hind, and shark
species are also included in y1.11 The second output category, y2, consists primarily of
deep water groupers including yellowedge, misty and warsaw groupers, plus speckled hind,
golden, blueline and other tile fishes. The third output category consists of all non-reef
fish such as king mackerel, yellowfin tuna, bonito, and wahoo. Hereafter, outputs y1, y2,
and y3, are referred to as shallow water groupers, deep water groupers and non-reef fish,
respectively.
Shallow water groupers make up 88.1% of the sample vessel catch. Deep water groupers
comprise 5.7% of sample vessel catch, and non-reef fish represent 5.0%. The two main
variable inputs for reef fish vessels are labor, measured as the total number of captain plus
crew days at sea, and fuel, which is measured as total gallons burned. The labor input is
denoted x1 and the fuel input as x2. Other variable inputs are ice used to preserve harvested
fish, bait, and lost fishing gear. It is assumed that these inputs are used in proportion to
10These assumptions are consistent with fishing practices as described to us by grouper fishermen.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that output aggregation could bias the results that follow.
11Discussion with fishermen indicated that shark species are harvested using similar methods and are
found a similar depths as shallow water groupers. Sharks make up a small component (5.4%) of the first
output category.
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Mean. Std. dev. Min.. Max.
Shallow water groupers (y1) 27.01 29.97 0 133.62.
Deep water groupers (y2) 1.67 6.20 0 61.79.
Non-reef fish (y3) 0.34 0.96 0 6.98
Total Catch 29.02 30.39 0.13 133.75
Trips from Port 13.08 11.93 1 77
Days at Sea 63.58 53.86 1 256
Labor (x1) 191.75 175.63 1 802
Fuel (x2) 3,200.32 3,403.76 42 20,000
Capital services (x3) 2,700.87 2,555.22 24 13,568
Vessel Length (feet) 40.66 10.80 20 73
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for 1993 Reef Fish Vessels. Harvest quantities are
thousands of pounds, labor is in units of worker days at sea, fuel is in
gallons, and capital services is in vessel foot days at sea. There are 149
observations.
the pounds of harvested fish. Ice, bait and lost gear costs are incorporated in the analysis
below by adjusting the output price for fish.
Table 1 reports sample descriptive statistics. Notice that the composition of species
harvested, and the scale of operation, measured by total catch and days at sea, varies widely
across sample vessels. In all, 149 vessels harvested shallow water groupers; 74 harvested
deep water groupers and 91 harvested non-reef fish. The number of trips taken ranges
between 1 and 77. Days at sea range between 1 and 256. Variation in vessel capital is also
indicated; the average vessel length is 40.66 feet, the range in the vessel length is between
20 and 73 feet.
A comment on the measurement of capital services is warranted. It may be diﬃcult
(costly) to increase the flow of capital services that are provided by a vessel of fixed size.
Vessel capital is a lumpy input and fisherman cannot employ a fraction of its available
service. The implication for modeling the harvest technology is that vessel capital services
can be viewed as a weakly disposable or congested input. An increase in the capital services
likely requires an increase in other inputs (labor and fuel) in order to maintain a given output
level. The structure restriction of weak input disposability for x3 is examined below.
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3.1 Empirical methodology
The goal of the empirical analysis is to derive consistent unbiased estimates of Farrell output
eﬃciency, δ(y, x) = 1 +
−→
D(x, y|y), and to investigate the eﬀects of environmental factors
on harvesting performance. Environmental factors may include the skill level of the vessel
captain and crew, stock abundance, quasi-fixed capital, vessel ownership and/or regulations
used to control overfishing. Conditional on a given set of environmental factors, which we
denote z ∈ <L+, vessel operators organize conventional inputs, labor, fuel and capital services
and target output groups, shallow water groupers, deep water groupers, and non-reef fish
species to best meet management objectives.
Following Simar and Wilson (2007), we assume that sample observations are indepen-
dently and identically distributed random variables drawn from a common probability den-
sity function, and that the conditional distribution of Farrell output eﬃciency δ(y, x|z)
operates through the mechanism;
(5) δ(y, x|z) = zβ + ε,
where ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε). Equation (5) decomposes output ineﬃciency into a systematic com-
ponent, zβ, and a non-systematic term, ε. Hereafter, we refer to ε as the idiosyncratic
component of output eﬃciency. By construction ε represents vessel-specific ineﬃciency
which is unexplained by the conditioning component zβ. A semi-parametric model is used
to obtain consistent estimates of β and σε and bias-corrected estimates of δ(y, x|z) for each
vessel operation (see Simar and Wilson, 2007, for a complete description of the estimation
procedure).
The semi-parametric model oﬀers distinct advantages over standard one-step nonpara-
metric methods. First, a double-bootstrap procedure corrects for downward bias inherent
in finite sample non-parametric eﬃciency estimation.12 A second advantage, which may
be particularly important for predicting harvesting performance under new management,
relates to the decomposition of total eﬃciency into its systematic and idiosyncratic compo-
12See Simar and Wilson (2000) for additional discussion of bias in non-parametric (data envelopment
analysis) estimation. Walden (2006) applies a bootstrap bias correction in a non-parametric analysis U.S.
mid-Atlantic sea scallop fishermen.
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nents. Identifying environment factors which explain systematic ineﬃciency can refine ex
ante predictions of harvesting performance under IFQs. For example, highly skilled vessel
skippers will earn higher profit margins and are thus more likely to remain active under the
proposed IFQ management program. Identifying a systematic relationship between skill (or
a proxy for skill) and output eﬃciency refines predictions of harvesting performance, i.e.,
predictions of which vessel operations will remain active under new management can be
conditioned on z. On the contrary, the causes of idiosyncratic ineﬃciency, ε, are unknown.
Idiosyncratic ineﬃciency must be treated diﬀerently when constructing ex ante estimates
of IFQ-regime harvesting performance. Section 4 below demonstrates the diﬀerential treat-
ment of total ineﬃciency.
Lastly, researchers have proposed alternative methods for incorporating environmental
factors into the analysis of production eﬃciency (see Coelli et al., 1998, pp. 166-172 for
a review of these methods). The current approach is based on a coherent data generating
process and has been shown to exhibit superior estimation performance in Monte Carlo
experiments (Simar and Wilson, 2007).
3.1.1 Environmental factors and harvesting performance
A potentially important factor impacting the performance of commercial harvesting opera-
tions is the skill level of the vessel captain and crew (Squires and Kirkley, 1999). Our data
contain the years of experience for the vessel captain which we use to proxy the skill of the
labor employed by each vessel operation. Another factor which may cause ineﬃciency in the
short run is the vessel configuration (e.g., vessel size, age, engine horsepower, crew berths).
While non-optimal vessel configurations are likely to be replaced over time, constraints on
capital investment and divestment may keep unproductive vessels active in the short run.
Available proxies for the configuration of the vessel capital include vessel length, age, hull
type (e.g., wood, fiberglass or steel) and engine horsepower.
Our data reports the region of each vessels’ principle port. Regions range from the
Florida Keys, to the northern waters oﬀ the coast of Franklin, Wakulla and Taylor counties
in northwest Florida. Regional eﬀects may capture diﬀerences in unobserved local stock
abundance. Our data reports the main port from which each vessel fishes; we do not
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observe the actual location of fishing. Since vessels can easily move across regions and
land fish at any port, it is questionable whether the region of port variable can proxy for
diﬀerences in stock abundance. A second limitation is that a common regional eﬀect cannot
control for diﬀerences in abundance across multiple reef fish species. On the other hand,
since policy makers are likely to be concerned about the distributional impacts of the IFQ
program on local communities, inclusion of the regional variable can be informative.
Lastly, three diﬀerent gear types were used in the grouper fishery in 1993; longline gear,
vertical lines and fish traps (regulations eliminated fish trap gear in 2007). Many vessels
specialize in a single gear type, although 30 boats in the sample report fishing with multiple
gear types. To test whether diﬀerences in the gear used to harvest reef fish aﬀects vessel
performance, the share of each vessel’s trips that used longline, vertical line, and fish trap
gear are included as environmental factors.
4 Results
Following standard procedures, only minimal assumptions of closedness and convexity for
the underlying harvest technology are imposed a priori. We allow the data to determine
additional structural assumptions. The empirical model is estimated under three structural
assumptions; (i) variable returns to scale with weak disposability for capital services, x3,
and strong disposability for fuel and labor, (ii) variable returns and strong disposability for
all inputs, and (iii) constant returns with weak disposability for x3.13 The variable returns
and weak capital disposability assumptions fit the data best. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test of free input disposability for vessel capital services is rejected at the 97.7% level of
confidence. The structural restriction of constant returns to scale is rejected also at the
13An estimate of the feasible set eT under the maintained hypothesis of weak-capital (x3) disposibility and
variable returns to scale is,
eT = {(x, y) : ym ≤Skλkyk,m, m = 1, 2, 3,
xn ≥
S
kλkxk,n, n = 1, 2,
μxn =
S
kλkxk,n, n = 3,S
kλk = 1, λk ≥ 0, ∀k, 0 ≤ μ ≤ 1}
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Model 1 Model 2
Variable Estimate 90% c.i. Estimate 90% c.i.
Intercept 16.025 [8.400, 20.253] 19.108 [11.955, 20.552]
Exper. -0.104 [-0.190, 0.015] -0.111 [-0.191, -0.001]
Exper.2 0.003 [.23e-4, 0.004] 0.003 [.64e-4, 0.004]
Length -0.566 [-0.653, -0.223] -0.644 [-0.669, -0.297]
Length2 0.006 [0.002, 0.007] 0.007 [0.003, 0.007]
Shr.Vert 1.451 [-0.066, 1.626] - -
Shr.Trap 0.985 [-0.548, 1.517] - -
Region 0.015 [-0.152, 0.156] - -
σε 2.271 [2.143, 2.696] 2.329 [2.246, 2.696]
Table 2: Parameter Estimates and Bootstrap Confidence Intervals ‘Exper.’ is
years of experience for vessel captain; ‘Length’ is vessel length in feet;
‘Shr.Vert’ is catch share using vertical hook and line gear; ‘Shr.Trap’ is
share of catch using trap gear; ‘Region’ is region of vessel’s main port;
There are 149 observations.
97.7% confidence level. Unless noted, the results that follow assume variable returns to
scale and weak disposability for x3.
Table 2 reports parameter estimates and 90% double bootstrap confidence intervals
for β and σε. Results from two model specifications are reported.14 Model 1 includes a
constant term, skipper experience (Exper.) and vessel length (Length), both of which are
entered qaudratically, gear type variables (Shr.Vert and Shr.Trap) and region (Region) of
the vessel’s main port. The base case includes vessels which take primarily longline gear
trips.
Results indicate that output eﬃciency is impacted nonlinearly by captain experience
and vessel length. Captains with roughly 20 years experience tend to attain the highest
eﬃciency scores, whereas captains with less and more years experience operate farther from
the frontier. Vessels that are roughly 46 feet in length tend to attain highest eﬃciency;
shorter and longer boats do not perform as well. Model 1 find that gear types and region
of main port do not have a statistically significant eﬀect on harvesting eﬃciency, as the
parameters associated with these variables have 90% confidence intervals that contain zero.
14Several alternative specifications which included cross eﬀects were considered and rejected. Other envi-
ronmental factors such as engine horse power and vessel hull construction (i.e., wood, fiberglass and steel)
were found to have insignificant or trivial eﬀects on output eﬃciency.
15
Model 2 of Table 2 reports results with gear type and region variables dropped. The
results are almost unchanged indicating again that captains with roughly 20 years experience
and vessels 46 feet in length attain the highest Farrell eﬃciency scores.
Based on the specification of model 2 in Table 2 the results indicate considerable ineﬃ-
ciency is present in the data. The sample mean value of δ(x, y|z) is 3.53 (the median is 2.56,
and the standard deviation is 3.37). To more easily interpret these results we invert δ(x, y|z)
to obtain estimates of the Shephard output distance function. The sample average value
for Do(x, y) is 0.491 indicating that on average vessels harvested only 49.1% of the frontier
harvest quantity. The extent of ineﬃciency indicated is significant but not unusual in the
analysis of commercial fisheries. For instance, Weninger and Waters (2003) report that reef
fish vessels in the northern Gulf of Mexico harvested 65%-70% of the frontier quantity of red
snapper and other reef fish species, respectively. These authors calculate a directional dis-
tance function which expands output non-radially, and employ a single-step nonparametric
model which is biased upward. Note that without the bootstrap bias correction, the sample
average value for Do(x, y) among our sample of grouper fishermen increases to 0.569, which
is similar to previous work.
The low eﬃciency indicated in the grouper data may be explained by the presence of
part-time vessel operations (Table 1). Part-time fishermen take only a few trips each season
and harvest small quantities of reef fish. These vessels may be considerably less productive
than their full time counterparts which are operated by experienced, and likely more-skilled,
captain and crew. The ineﬃciency found in the data does suggest a source of economic gain
under IFQ management. In particular, redistributing the harvesting responsibilities to the
eﬃcient boats in the fleet will reduce the inputs per unit of harvested fish and thus reduce
the cost of harvesting the allowable reef fish catch. Of the 990 commercially licensed vessels
that reported reef fish landings in the 1993 National Marine Fisheries Service logbook data,
525 reported less than 5,000 pounds of total landings. Thus the number of part time vessels
is large, as should be the gains from redistributing their catch share to full time operations.
Higher Farrell output eﬃciency will yield higher profit per unit of reef fish harvest. The
results in Table 2 are thus suggestive of the types of vessel operations most likely to remain
active under IFQ management. Note however, that this conclusion does not account for the
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idiosyncratic component of harvesting performance reflected in the error term ε. That is,
there appears to be an important component of output eﬃciency which is not explained by
environmental factors. The next section exploits the results in Table 2 to predict fleet size
and overall harvesting performance expected under IFQ management.
5 Fleet structure and economic gains under IFQ manage-
ment
We will suppose that the 1993 grouper fishery is managed with IFQs for shallow and deep
water groupers, and that the commercial fleet is in equilibrium as described by condition C1,
and C2 in Section 2. To simulate conditions in the fishery in 1993 we assume that the total
harvest permits issued are equal to the quantity of reef fish harvested by the commercial
fleet. Log book records indicate that 13.092 million pounds of shallow water groupers and
0.622 million pounds of deep water groupers, for a total of 13.754 million pounds of reef
fish, were harvested in the eastern region in 1993.15 Total allowable harvests are set at
Y1 = 13.092 million pounds and Y2 = .622 million pounds. The equilibrium fleet structure
is calculated following similar steps as in Weninger and Waters (2003). The analysis will
then be repeated to simulate more recent allowable catch targets which are Y1 = 9.8 million
pounds and Y2 = 1.6 million pounds.
We begin with a prediction of activity levels for representative vessel lengths. As noted,
under IFQs active vessels will adjust inputs and outputs to exploit available economies of
scale and scope in production. Skippers inform us that gear modifications are required to
harvest non-reef fish species, y3. These modifications represent a superadditive fixed cost
for a vessel operation. We find no evidence to suggest cost complementarity between reef
and non reef fish species. This suggests there are diseconomies of scope associated with the
harvest of non-reef fish species. Correspondingly, the output harvested by an IFQ-regime
vessel is predicted to consist of positive quantities of reef fish, y1 and y2, and zero quantity
of non-reef fish species, y3 = 0. Predicting the precise mix of y1 and y2 for active vessels will
15The total catch of non-reef fish species was 0.651 million pounds in 1993.
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not be attempted.16 Rather, we assume that representative vessels harvest a mix of reef fish
equal to the total allowable harvest quantities during the 1993 season, i.e., y2/y1 = Y2/Y1.
The results of section 4 find that the reef fish harvest technology exhibits variable returns
to scale. A large number of boats in the sample (73 of 149 or 49%) are found to operate in
a region of increasing returns. Consolidating the reef fish catch onto fewer boat will reduce
variable harvesting costs for the fleet. Furthermore, indications are the 1993 fleet is (was)
large compared to the fleet that will remain active under the IFQ program (see additional
results below). Reef fish vessels incur non-trivial annual fixed costs in the form of vessel
and gear maintenance costs, docking fees, license fees, and accounting and legal fees. This
implies that a reduction in the fleet size under the IFQ regime will reduce annual fixed costs
incurred by the commercial fleet.
We identify the optimal scale of operation using the following approach. Our results
from section 4 find that 30 of the 149 vessels in our sample attain a Farrell eﬃciency score
of unity; these vessels operate on the boundary of the variable returns to scale output
set, bT . The observed inputs for these boats provide the benchmark input bundle for our
representative vessels. Holding the input bundle fixed, we estimate the directional distance
function for output by = (1, Y2/Y1, 0) using directional vector gy = by. We then calculate the
frontier output, yf = by(1 +−→D(x, y|by)). The result yf is the frontier output conditional on
the assumed output mix and the input bundle used by eﬃcient sample boats. The estimated
activity (x, yf ) is thus fully eﬃcient, in the sense that it attains Farrell technical eﬃciency
δ(x, yf ) = 1.
Condition C2 in Section 2 states that the IFQ regime fleet will be comprised of the most
eﬃcient vessels in the fleet. The switch to IFQ management does not imply that all active
vessel will operate on the boundary of the feasible technology, i.e., some level of harvesting
ineﬃciency is expected to persist under the new management program. The frontier output
yf must be adjusted to account for harvesting ineﬃciency under the IFQ program. The
following steps are used to make this adjustment.
The semi-parametric model finds that systematic output eﬃciency is highest on ves-
16See Squires and Kirkley (1995, 1996) for additional discussion of equilibrium fleet structure in multi-
species fisheries under rights-based management.
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sels 46 feet long, operated by skippers with 20 years experience, but that the idiosyncratic
component of the output eﬃciency, ε, represents a significant component of measured per-
formance. Vessel operations with the lowest value of ε are expected to remain active. We
can rank the idiosyncratic eﬃciency from lowest to highest to calculate an expected level of
output eﬃciency attained by the active IFQ-regime fleet. The calculations are as follows.
We first calculate the q’th quantile value εq. Recall that ε is a left truncated normally
distributed random variable with mean zero and variance σ2ε . For conditioning variables z
the estimate of εq is obtained as,
εq = bσεΦ−1 ³q +Φ³(1− zbβ)/bσε´´ ,
where hats denote estimated parameter values, and Φ(.) is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. We then calculate the expected value of ε conditional on ε being
below the q’th quantile value εq;
εq = E[ε|ε < εq] = φ(εL)− φ(εU )Φ(εU )−Φ(εL) ,
where εL = (1 − zbβ)/bσε, εU = εq/bσε, and φ(.) is the standard normal density function.
The expectation of Farrell output eﬃciency, conditional on idiosyncratic eﬃciency falling
below the q’th quantile value is then obtained as δq = zbβ + εq. Finally, predicted harvest
conditional on δq is then obtained as y = yf/δq.
Table 3 reports estimates of vessel activity levels, harvesting costs, fleet size, harvest
permit prices and fishery rent predicted in the IFQ-managed grouper fishery. For compar-
ison, three vessel lengths, and two levels of expected idiosyncratic harvesting performance
are considered. Results in the top half of the table assume that the marginal or least eﬃ-
cient vessel in the IFQ-regime fleet attains the 20’th quantile value of idiosyncratic output
eﬃciency (estimated from our sample vessels). Results in the table’s lower half assume the
marginal boat attains the 10’th quantile value for ε. All results assume that the vessel
captain has 20 years experience.
Fixed cost estimates are obtained from the cost survey data and consist primarily of hull
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Length δq y1 y2 FC VC RAC r1 r2 Boats Rent
feet ’000 lbs. ’000 lbs. ’000 $ ’000 $ $ $ $ $ Mill.
δq= 0.20
35 1.979 20.687 0.983 2.237 41.995 2.014 -0.102 -0.165 633 -1.443
45 1.747 51.508 2.447 2.874 82.027 1.574 0.365 0.302 254 4.971
55 1.867 56.063 2.664 3.511 103.098 1.815 0.123 0.060 234 1.654
δq= 0.10
35 1.552 26.388 1.254 2.237 41.995 1.600 0.339 0.276 496 4.605
45 1.399 64.321 3.056 2.874 82.027 1.260 0.679 0.616 204 9.269
55 1.477 70.886 3.368 3.511 103.098 1.436 0.503 0.440 185 6.860
Table 3: Predicted vessel activity and fleet structure under IFQ management. FC is
fixed cost, VC is variable cost, RAC is ray average cost. All values are
US 1993 dollars.
and gear maintenance costs, docking, licensing, administrative, and legal fees, and insurance
expenses. Ray average cost (RAC) is calculated as variable plus fixed cost divided by total
catch, where units are normalized to y1 = 1, and y2 = Y2/Y1 (Baumol, et al. 1982).
Consider the results for q = 0.20. Consistent with the results in section 4, RAC is lowest
for 45 foot boats. A 45 foot boat operating at eﬃcient scale of production could earn a
harvest permit rent of $0.365, and $0.302 per pound for shallow and deep water groupers,
respectively. The per pound rent earned on a 35 foot boats and 55 foot boats is less. In fact,
35 foot vessels attain expected Farrell output eﬃciency δ20 = 1.979 and do not cover total
costs at 1993 reef fish prices, i.e., the per unit rent which includes the harvest permit rental
is negative for 35 foot boats. With harvest permit lease prices in the range of r1 = $0.365
and r2 = $0.302, 35 foot and 55 foot operations are unprofitable when quota ownership
opportunity costs are taken into account. The model predicts that these smaller and larger
boats will not remain active under IFQ management.
The last column in Table 3 reports an estimate of the fishery resource rent generated
under the various fleet structures. If the IFQ-regime fleet is made up entirely of 45 foot
vessels, 254 such vessels would be required to harvest the 13.092 millions pounds taken from
the fishery in 1993. A fleet consisting of 254, 45 foot boats, earns total revenues less total
costs equal to $4.97 million.
The results for the case where the marginal boat attains the q =10’th quantile level of
Farrell output eﬃciency change in expected ways. Harvest per vessel is increased due to
20
increased output eﬃciency. Vessel costs are unchanged, which means that RAC declines.
Harvest permits prices increase as does total fishery resource rent. Notice that when δ10 is
assumed, RAC on 35 foot boats is below 1993 prices. Of course, rent per unit of harvest
remains below the level attained on 45 foot and on 55 foot boats. Again the model predicts
that these smaller and larger boats will be inactive under the IFQ program.
The predicted fleet sizes in Table 3 illustrate the extent of fleet downsizing that is ex-
pected under IFQs. While a precise measure of the size of the active fleet in the grouper
fishery is diﬃcult to conceive due to the part-time nature of many vessels and vessel partic-
ipation in multiple fisheries, the number of vessels that reported landings in 1993 provides a
qualitative indication of expected downsizing.17 National Marine Fisheries Service log book
data indicate that 990 vessels harvested positive quantities of reef fish in the eastern Gulf
region in 1993. Many of these boats landed only small quantities of grouper and other reef
fish found in the eastern Gulf region; 465 reported harvests in excess of 5,000 pounds, 331
reported harvests in excess of 10,000 pounds, and 229 reported harvests in excess of 20,000
pounds. The results in Table 3 suggest that the IFQ-regime fleet size would range between
200-250 vessels. Notice that the total catch per vessel in (Table 3) is in the range of 54,000
pounds for a 45 foot boat. Further examination finds that the average catch for the 149
sample boats is a mere 29,020 thousand pounds (Table 1). Of the 149 sample boats, seventy
five percent harvested less than 41,000 total pounds (including non-reef fish species). Thus
the raw data appear to support the predictions for equilibrium fleet size reported in Table
3.
We next compare the actual fishery rent in 1993 with the rent that is predicted under
the IFQ-regime fleet. The rent diﬀerence is an economic benefit of management reform.
To make this calculation we require an estimate of the costs incurred by 1993 reef fish
boats. As mentioned above, one problem in estimating actual total cost is that sample
vessels participate part time and in other fisheries. It is not clear how much of the annual
fixed costs should be attributed to grouper fishing. We avoid this complication by focussing
on variable costs only. It should be emphasized that because fixed cost savings are not
17Commercial fishing vessels operating in the eastern Gulf of Mexico reef fish (grouper) fishery harvest
multiple reef and non reef fish species, using multiple gear types throughout each year. A complete accounting
of annual vessel-level harvesting activities is not available.
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considered the results that follow represent a lower bound estimate of the total cost savings
expected under an IFQ management program.
An estimate of the actual reef fish variable costs in 1993 is obtained by first removing
sample vessels that harvested more than a 10% share of non-reef fish species (this removed
5 boats). We then multiply the variable harvesting costs for the remaining sample by their
respective share of the total sample reef fish harvest. Ray average variable costs are then
calculated for each sample boat and an estimate of fleet wide ray average variable costs is
obtained as a weighted average, with weights set as the vessel’s share of the total sample
catch.
This calculation yields an estimate of actual RAC in 1993 of $1.73, and an estimate of
total fleet variable cost (reef fish only) equal to $23.77 million. Vessel revenues in 1993 were
$26.55 million. Ray average variable costs under the predicted IFQ-regime fleet structure
range between $1.22 and $1.52 for 45 foot vessels, depending on the level of output eﬃciency
assumed. Variable harvest cost saving are thus estimated to range between $2.92 and $7.07
million dollars.
Lastly, we repeat the above calculations to examine fleet structure and economic rent
under the total allowable catch targets of Y1 = 9.8 million pounds of shallow water groupers
and Y2 = 1.6 million pounds for deep water groupers. We assume that the IFQ-regime fleet
is comprised of 45 foot vessels with the marginal vessel attaining the q =10’th quantile
level of idiosyncratic eﬃciency. Under these smaller total allowable catch levels, the model
predicts a fleet size of 153 boats, and resource rents in the fishery equal to $7.64 million.
5.1 Implications for grouper management reform
The results suggest significant cost savings are available under an IFQ management program
in the Gulf of Mexico grouper fishery. Several factors should be considered when assessing
the robustness of these results. This section presents a necessarily informal discussion of
two of these factors. First, the cost savings estimates are derived from a sample of vessels
operating in 1993 and are thus conditional on the bioeconomic and regulatory conditions
that prevailed in the fishery at that time. Fleet structure, regulations and stock levels change
over time which suggests caution when extrapolating the cost savings estimates beyond the
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study period. Second, the analysis above assumes the IFQ harvest fleet is in equilibrium.
The cost savings that are realized during the transition to this equilibrium must be less
than under the new equilibrium, and delays in the transition to the new equilibrium will
reduce benefits from managmeent reform.
5.1.1 Extrapolation outside the sample data period.
The original Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan was implemented in November 1984.
The plan introduced regulations designed to rebuild declining reef fish stocks and included
prohibitions on certain gear types within an inshore stressed area, a minimum size limit of
13 inches total length for red snapper (an important target species in the northern region
of the Gulf reef fish fishery) and data reporting requirements.
More recent concerns of overfishing for grouper species have resulted in a host of addi-
tional regulations. Secretarial Amendment 1 to the Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan
(July 15, 2004) established a 5.31 million pound commercial quota for red grouper and
reduced aggregate quotas for shallow and deep water groupers. The shallow water grouper
quota was lowered from 9.8 to 8.80 million pounds. The red grouper quota was established
at 5.31 million pounds and the deep water grouper quota was reduced from 1.6 million to
1.02 million pounds. Under the aggregate quota regulations, the fishery is closed as soon as
the quota is met (closure of the shallow water grouper fishery occurs as soon as either the
red grouper or the aggregate shallow water grouper quota is met).
To slow the ensuing race for fish under aggregate quota regulations, per trip catch limits
of 6,000 pounds of grouper species were implemented in March 2005. Trip limits were
however not suﬃciently restrictive and seasonal closures for both shallow and deep water
groupers have been required since 2005. Grouper fisheries are also closed from February 15
through March 15 to protection spawning aggregations. Finally, recently completed stock
assessments for gag grouper raise new concerns of overfishing. An aggregate gag grouper
quota and further tightening of trip limits are now being considered by regulators.
The top panel of Figure 1 reports the number of commercially licensed vessels that
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Figure 1: Fleet Size, Stock Abundance and Grouper Landings, 1993-2005.
registered positive grouper landings during 1993-2005.18 The data show that participating
vessels have declined steadily from 923 in 1993 to 671 in 2005. While the grouper fishery
has seen a 27.3% decline in the number of active vessels, the 2005 fleet remains considerably
larger than is predicted under the IFQ equilibrium (200-250 boats).
The bottom panel in the Figure reports estimates of red and gag stock abundance over
the same period. Stock assessments for other grouper species are not available. Estimates
indicate that red grouper stock abundance has increased since 1993 whereas gag grouper
abundance increased during 1995 and 2001 and declined thereafter. The table reports both
red and gag grouper abundance that is slightly larger in 2005 than in 1993. The bottom
18Data in Figure 1 are from the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council (2007). Fleet size is calculated
as the number of vessels with positive landings of any grouper species, and thus diﬀers from vessel numbers
reported above.
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panel also reports the aggregate commercial grouper landings during the 1993-2005 period.
Absent from the Figure is the fleet-wide average harvesting costs during the period. One
might speculate that the decline in the grouper fleet was due in part to the exit of relatively
ineﬃcient vessel operations. If this is the case, the cost savings from a switch to IFQ
management in the current day fishery could be less than suggested by the analysis of our
1993 data. The bottom panel reveals that total landings of grouper species have remained
fairly flat since 1993 (note that landings of other reef fish species are not included). Hence,
the annual catch per boat has increased by roughly 49% between 1993 and 2005. If a larger
share of the annual reef fish harvest was landed by the remaining, relatively eﬃcient, vessels
during 1993-2005, the cost savings measured in 1993 may overstate gains from management
reform.
On the other hand, it is very likely that recently implemented per trip catch limits and
seasonal closures have resulted in further increases in unit harvesting costs. Taking these
recent regulatory developments into account suggests that cost savings estimates based
on the less restrictive regulations in 1993 likely understate the benefits from management
reform in the current day fishery.
Finally, it should be emphasized that because the analysis of this paper relies on cur-
rently available data, adjustments in marketing practices, capital configuration, process
innovations, or adjustments in total catch quotas, which may also occur in response to IFQ
operating rules, are not considered in the estimation of benefits. The form and extent of
these adjustment are diﬃcult to predict ex ante. However, such adjustments are expected
to occur only if they are deemed privately profitable from the viewpoint of industry. To the
extent that IFQs correct market failures in fisheries, privately optimal investments should
increase economic rents generated in the grouper fishery. Correspondingly, the estimate of
economic benefits reported in this paper represent a lower bound to the full benefits that
are available in the fishery in the longer term.
5.1.2 Delays in fleet restructuring
Indications are that significant fleet downsizing must occur before the full eﬃciency gains
from IFQ management are realized. Work by Weninger and Just (1997), and more recently
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Vestergaard et al. (2005) provide theoretical analyses of fleet adjustment in the transition
from an open access to an IFQ-managed fishery. These studies provide little practical
guidance to predict actual patterns of fleet adjustment, or the speed with which adjustments
might take place.
Fleet restructuring in fisheries that have switched to IFQ management may provide
some insights. Researchers find that following the implementation of IFQs in New Zealand
fisheries, the rate of vessel exit was initially rapid for some vessel classes but slow and
steady for others. Studies also reveal that small-scale fishing operations were more likely to
exit under the new Quota Management System (Stewart et al. 2006; Stewart and Walshe,
forthcoming). Data reported in Turner and Weninger (2006) indicate that vessel capital
was shed rapidly during the first year of the individual fishing quota program in the U.S.
Mid-Atlantic clam fishery. The restructuring process followed a more gradual process in
subsequent years. In sum, past experiences with IFQ management in fisheries suggest that
fleet restructuring could be prolonged.
In sum, the rate of restructuring and the date at which the IFQ-equilibrium will emerge
in the grouper fishery remains a complex issue that is beyond the scope of this paper.
6 Conclusion
This paper constructs an ex ante estimate of the economic benefits of implementing a rights-
based (IFQ) fisheries management program in the eastern Gulf of Mexico reef fish fishery.
A semi parametric model is used to analyze harvesting ineﬃciency under the current con-
trolled access management system. The empirical model corrects for bias inherent in single
step non-parametric eﬃciency analysis and provides a framework to consistently identify
the impacts of environmental factors on harvesting performance. The paper shows how
identification of these factors can refine estimates of the economic benefits expected under
rights-based management, and may guide policy makers concerned with the transitional
impacts of management reform.
Results find significant harvesting ineﬃciency due to operation at non-optimal scale of
operation and technical ineﬃciency persist under the controlled access management program
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in the eastern Gulf reef fish fishery. Findings suggest further that moderately sized vessels
operated by mid-career captains attain the highest level of harvesting eﬃciency, and thus
are expected to dominate the IFQ-regime fleet. Scale economies are predicted under IFQs
as the reef fish allowable catch is consolidated onto fewer boats. Pure technical eﬃciency
gains are also expected as the bulk of the harvesting responsibility is carried out by the
most productive vessel operations in the fleet.
Calculations reveal that the equilibrium IFQ-regime fleet would be reduced considerably
from current levels to roughly 200-250 vessels. The results suggest that the total reef fish
catch in 1993, if harvested by a smaller more productive IFQ-regime fleet, could be harvested
at cost saving in the range of $2.92-$7.07 million (12-30% below actual costs incurred).
Additional fixed cost savings due to fleet downsizing push the cost saving estimate even
higher.
Designing and implementing an IFQ management program presents a serious challenge
for regulators and industry. Delays in the transition to the rationalized fleet could take time,
and exiting boats could relocate to other fisheries causing further management problems.
On the other hand, continuing with the current system of cost-increasing input controls does
not hold much promise. Very recently, regulators have proposed additional restrictions on
commercial harvesting activities including total catch limits for gag grouper and a further
tightening of per trip grouper catch limits. These restrictions may reduce reef fish mortality
but can only cause further increases in harvesting costs. An IFQ program may present an
attractive alternative for managers and industry.
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